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This paper will explore connections between competing conceptions of scientific laws on the one hand, and a puzzle in the foundations of statistical mechanics on the other.  The puzzle is to reconcile the asymmetry of the second law of thermodynamics with the evident time symmetry of the laws of microscopic dynamics.  Many solutions to this puzzle have been proposed, but one, a proposal based on Hans Reichenbach’s “branch systems”, has received insufficient attention because it is commonly thought to be inadequate.  
In what follows, I resurrect the branch systems proposal.  I demonstrate that there is a particular conception of scientific laws that motivates the arguments used to dismiss this proposal.  I argue that the motivation for rejecting the branch systems proposal out of hand is entirely grounded in what might be called the “possible worlds” conception of scientific laws.   This is the view that laws are universally valid, and delimit the range of possible worlds.   But there is an alternative view.   On what I call the “framework” view of laws, the motivation for dismissing the branch systems proposal disappears, and it becomes a viable solution to an important foundational problem.  I take this to be grounds for a renewed interest in so called “branch systems”, as well as evidence for the strength of the framework view of laws.
A Foundational Problem
On the one hand we have the laws of thermodynamics, which tell us that all macroscopic systems of a certain kind behave asymmetrically in time.  On the other hand we have the fact that each of our candidate laws for describing the behavior of the microscopic constituents of those systems is time symmetric.   How are we to reconcile this seeming incompatibility?  
Suppose we have a thermodynamic system S, and set of laws M that govern the microscopic components of S.  Thermodynamics tells us that if S is in a macrocondition A, then it will evolve over some period of time T into macrocondition B.  To explain this, it is standard to begin by arguing that almost all of the volume of the region of phase space that is associated with A is occupied by microconditions that, when subjected to the laws M, will evolve over the period of time T into a region of phase space associated with the macrocondition B.​[1]​ While this conclusion has never been shown to be true, it is safe to say that it has been made at least plausible by arguments going back to Boltzmann and Gibbs.
But that is only the first step.  So now suppose that we are given a system like S, and only the information that it has the property of being in macrocondition A.  We know that the microcondition of this system lies within some region R of phase space; the region that is compatible with A.  If, as our next step, we were to assume that, given any system S in condition A, the probability of the microcondition of S being in some tiny region of R, (call it r) is proportional to the volume of r—call this supposition “Boltzmann’s postulate—then we would be off to the races.
Since almost all of the microconditions compatible with A (in the sense of phase space volume) evolve into microconditions compatible with B, if the probability of the microcondition of S being in r is proportional to the volume of r, then the probability that condition A will evolve into condition B is overwhelming high.  And this is exactly what we want to show.
Unfortunately, all we have accomplished so far is to have put ourselves in a position to better articulate the real source of original problem, what is frequently referred to as the “reversibility objection.”    The problem is that if the second law of thermodynamics is a true law about the world, and our laws about the microworld are all time reversible, then the reversibility objection shows that the claim that Boltzmann’s postulate holds for all systems at all times must be false.
Suppose, for example, that our system S is an isolated glass containing water.   Suppose that the present macrocondition of the system is that it contains some ice and water.  There is some region R of the phase space of that system that is compatible with a specific such macrocondition.  And, if Boltzmann’s postulate is true of that system at the present time, then it will certainly follow that it is overwhelming probable that at some time in the future, the glass will contain only water at some uniform temperature.  So far, this sounds good.  But since our microlaws are time symmetric, it also follows, by the very same reasoning, that if Boltzmann’s postulate holds at the present time, then it is overwhelmingly likely that at some time in the past, the glass contained only water at some uniform temperature.  This retrodiction not only contradicts the second law of thermodynamics, it contradicts our everyday experiences.  The only reasonable conclusion to draw from this is that, as plausible as it sounds, Boltzmann’s postulate cannot possibly be universally true.
Branch Systems
So what should we replace it with?  David Albert (2000) has shown that all we need is an application of something like Boltzmann’s postulate, but one which only holds at the beginnings of things.  This, he makes plausible, would get things right in predicting that macroconditions will evolve forward in time in accordance with the second law, without getting things wrong in our retrodictions.  But here is the rub.  How exactly can we suppose that to occur?
Here is one proposal.  Inspired by Hans Reichenbach in The Direction of Time, (Reichenbach 1956), it is better articulated by Paul Davies.   The idea is that
all of our observations and experiments in thermodynamics refer to what Reichenbach calls branch systems, rather than permanently isolated systems.  Branch systems are regions of the world which separate off from the main environment and exist thereafter as quasi-isolated systems, and usually merge once again with the wider environment after a sufficient time.  (Davies, 1977, p. 69)
If we can identify the moment at which all thermodynamically relevant systems come into being, we need then only assume that Boltzmann’s postulate holds at these, and only at these, moments.  We can then expect that systems will evolve forwards in time towards equilibrium, but we are free from the worry that they should have been expected to have evolved from equilibrium in the past in virtue of the simple fact that they did not exist in the past.  The problem appears to be solved.
The branch systems proposal has not been greeted with great acclaim in the literature.   Presently, I will defend it against some criticisms.  But first, I want to consider two arguments against versions of the branch systems proposal which I think are on the mark, and which need to be accommodated.   No defense should be mounted against these criticisms.  Rather, I want to offer a version of the proposal that is immune to these criticisms​[2]​  The first of these critical remark comes from Albert.   Albert thinks that Davies must have an epistemic understanding of the statistical-mechanical probabilities involved (Albert, 2000, p 89, fn). That is, on Albert’s construal of Davies’ proposal, the claim that Boltzmann’s postulate holds at a certain point in time is a fact about our collective ignorance of the exact state of affairs that obtain at that point in time.  According to this picture, moreover, the claim is supposed to be “innocent” (Albert’s word), that is, essentially without empirical content.  It’s supposed to be motivated simply by reasoning about we mean when we say that we know that a system is some macrostate. Albert has a very good argument that the epistemic argument provides inadequate justification for holding to the postulate.​[3]​  Furthermore, if it is the case that Davies thinks it is my ignorance of the exact microconditions which somehow justifies me invoking Boltzmann’s postulate, if the claim is “innocent”, then it is a fair question to ask why this argument should only work at the time that these branch systems come into being, rather than the middles, or the ends. (Albert, 2000 p.89, fn.)  And this, as we have seen, would be a disaster.
Since I take it that these are both good arguments, I in turn take it that it is a non-starter to think that epistemic probabilities have anything at all to do with the proposal we should investigate.  Thus, our game had better be to suppose that it is an empirical and contingent fact about the world that when branch systems come into being, the objective probability of their being in a particular region of phase space is proportional to the volume of space occupied by that region.
The second critical remark comes from Larry Sklar (1993).  Sklar imagines that Davies and Reichenbach are playing the game of trying to ground the very direction of time in terms of these considerations about branch systems.  Sklar rightly argues that the posit about branch systems can not possibly accomplish this much. To accomplish that, we would need to sneak in two hidden assumptions; 1)that all branch systems are exhibiting time evolution in the same direction—presumably because 2)this direction of evolution is the same as that of causal connection. (Sklar, 1993, p. 328)  Sklar notes that to make these two assumptions would be to illicitly smuggle a direction of time, the very thing we were supposedly trying to derive. 
As Sklar quite rightly points out, if what we are after is nothing less than an explanation of the origin of asymmetries in time, then there doesn't seem to be any non question-begging way to explain why coming-into-beings should be at all privileged as compared to reabsorptions. 
But if we are after significantly smaller game, that is, if all we are interested in doing is explaining how time-symmetric microlaws can be compatible with time-asymmetric macrolaws, then we are not doing anything question begging at all.    We can readily admit that we are helping ourselves to some other arrow that is already out there (for example, in the causal structure.)  All we need to do is make the perfectly sensible and pragmatic assumption that time does indeed have a privileged direction, and that this is the direction in which causal influences propagate.  We don’t smuggle this assumption in illicitly, hoping that no one will notice.  We simply state that just because all our candidate microlaws are time symmetric, this is no reason to deny the perfectly sensible claim that there is a privileged direction to time, and that causal relations obey it.  The asymmetry of the macro laws thus does not appear mysteriously at all.  It comes, as Sklar rightly points out, in part as a consequence of a basic assumption about causal orderings and temporality.
To review then, the proposal we should investigate after having reviewed the two forgoing critical points is the following:  Whenever a portion of the world separates off from the main environment and becomes energetically isolated, we suppose, as an empirical hypothesis, that whatever macrocondition that system is in, it will always be in a sub-region of the region of microscopic phase space compatible with that macrocondition with an objective probability in proportion to the volume of that sub-region.
Problems for Branch Systems
It is clear that this proposal about branch systems is immune to the two criticisms I have outlined above.  They are not even directed at it.   There are other criticisms, however, that cannot be dodged so easily.  Albert, in particular, has some worries about how (and why), precisely, this proposal is to be carried out (Albert, 2000, pp. 88-9).  He asks the following questions:
	How are we to decide at exactly what moment a branch system comes into being?
	Suppose our branch system is a glass with ice-water in it; why should we focus on the glass, and not the room in which the glass sits, or the building, or the city, etc.?
	 “Why in God’s name bother with all this, when the uniform probability-distribution over the possible microconditions compatible with the macrocondition of the world, at the moment when it came into being, will very straightforwardly give us everything we need?” (Albert, 2000, p. 89)
These are all good questions.​[4]​  I will answer them in reverse order.   If indeed there is a straightforward way to get everything we need merely by assuming that the statistical postulate holds at the beginning of the universe (lets call this the “big bang proposal”), then making the postulation over and over at the birth of each branch system would be, at best, superfluous.​[5]​   In what follow, however, I will question the claim that the big bang proposal will “straightforwardly give us everything we need?”
The Beginning of the Universe
Let’s see how the big bang proposal is supposed to work.  Recall the problem.  Suppose we have a thermodynamic system at time Tn in macrocondition Mn.  We wish to explain our ability to predict that at time Tn+1, the macrocondition of the system Mn+1 will be of a higher entropy than Mn.  We could do this by positing that the statistical postulate holds at Tn.  This will work.  It will also have, however, the unfortunate consequence of forcing us to predict that at time Tn-1 the macrocondition Mn-1 will also be of higher entropy than Mn.  This, of course, will not do.  The solution offered by the big bang proposal is to suppose that the relevant system is the universe as a whole, and that there is a uniform probability distribution, on the standard measure, over the region of microconditions that are compatible with the present macrocondition, but further restricted to those microconditions that are compatible with the macrocondition that held at the beginning of the universe.
We then add to the above what Albert calls the “past hypothesis.”  This is the supposition that the universe began “in whatever particular low-entropy highly condensed big-bang sort of macro-condition it is that the normal inferential procedures of cosmology will eventually present to us.”(p.96)  From this we can predict that for any time Ti in the history of the universe, the entropy of the universe  will be greater than the entropy at time Tj , if and only if j < i.  
So far so good; but this is not nearly enough.  In addition to showing how we predict that the entropy of the universe as a whole will increase over time, we also need to show how we can predict that the entropy of every energetically isolated system will evolve over time.
Suppose, for example, I were to right now go down to my kitchen, grab my Coleman cooler, fill it half way with lukewarm water, dump in the contents of the ice tray from my freezer, and shut the lid.  Presumably, I could then quite confidently predict that after a few hours time, if were to open up the lid, what I would find is cold water and no ice.   But how is it, according to the big bang proposal, that I am able to explain this fact?  
Clearly, something else is required here.  One possibility might be for me to try to argue that I can avail myself of the supposition that the Boltzmann postulate applied, not only to the universe at the beginning of the universe, but also to the contents of the cooler at the moment when I shut the lid.  But this reduces to the branch systems proposal.  The branch system assumes that the Boltzmann postulate applies only at the moment the system is prepared.  On Albert’s view, it is “absolute madness” to suppose that there is any such moment.  And so what the proponent of the big bang proposal must be required to do, is come up with a supposition that can be made of the cooler at any point in its life-time.  And that kind of supposition can’t be the Boltzmann postulate tout court, because that would cause us to make false retrodictions.
Since Albert doesn’t say what we should do about this sort of problem, the best we can do is to apply his reasoning about the world as a whole in an analogous way.  Presumably, the idea would be to apply the a uniform probability distribution, on the standard measure, over not all of the microconditions that are compatible with the current macrocondition of the cooler, but only over those that are also compatible with the supposition that the universe began in a very low entropy state.
Here it might be helpful to quote from Nick Hugget’s summary of Albert’s proposal.

“Conditionalizing not only on the current macrostate of a system but also on the initial macrostate, it is not only most likely that any system will increase in entropy to the future, but also that it will decrease in entropy to the past, as we believe.”
Will this work? Yes and no.  Conditionalizing on the current macrostate of the universe and also on the initial macrostate of the universe makes it overwhelmingly likely that the universe will decrease in entropy to the past.  But how does conditionalizing on the current macrostate of the cooler and the initial macrostate of the universe make it likely the cooler will decrease in entropy to the past?  At best, it seems to make it likely that, whatever increases in entropy there are going backward in the history of the cooler that they must be more than offset by greater decreases in entropy over the rest of the universe.  But that conclusion is of no use to us.  
It is difficult to imagine what the argument Albert (or Hugget) thinks he is going to supply for the stronger claim.  Such an argument is not supplied in Albert's book, and Hugget's quote doesn’t make it at all clear that he isn’t just being slippery with the word "system".  By "any system will...decrease in entropy to the past" does he mean any entire universe?  Then OK.  But if he means any briefly isolated subsystem, like my cooler, then I don’t see the argument.
But I want to argue for a stronger claim than that there is a missing argument. In fact I want to argue that the claim is false.  It is false that by positing a uniform probability distribution, on the standard measure, over the microconditions compatible with both the present macrocondition of the cooler, and with the “past hypothesis”, I can prevent myself from having to retrodict that the cooler was previously in a higher entropy macrostate.   Here is why.  If I apply a uniform probability distribution, on the standard measure, over the microconditions compatible with the present macrocondition of the cooler, then, unless the cooler has been energetically isolated since the beginning of time, then adding the further requirement that these microconditions be compatible with the low entropy state of the beginning of the universe is not adding any substantive further requirement at all.  The reason is this: in the time between the beginning of the universe and the time when the cooler lid gets shut, outside influences from the rest of the universe have been free to interfere with the state transitions of the contents cooler in any way we might imagine.  As a matter of fact, for example, for the period of time right before I closed the cooler lid, the ice had been in my freezer, where its entropy had been significantly lowered at the expense of an increase of entropy at my local power plant.  And so the dynamics of the contents of the cooler is completely unconstrained during the period prior to the lid being closed.  Consequently, any microstate that is compatible with the present state of the cooler is also one that is in principle compatible with the past hypothesis.
Hence, adding the requirement that the microstates of the cooler be compatible with the initial macrostate of the universe doesn’t screen off any of the possible microstates.  It doesn’t at all narrow down the volume of state space over which we apply the uniform distribution.  And hence, the uniform probability distribution applied over this “restricted” volume of state space is precisely the same as the uniform probability distribution applied over the states compatible with the present macrocondition.  And that distribution, as we have seen, forces us to retrodict in ways that are incompatible with the second law.  
So, the branch systems proposal seems to explain not only why the entropy of the universe is increasing, but also why the ice in my cooler will melt and has been melting, and the big bang proposal doesn’t.  And that is why we should bother with the branch systems proposal.
The Autonomy of Laws
Let’s now talk about Albert’s worries about the branch systems proposal.  The first is that we would somehow have to make a difficult choice as to what would count as a branch system, say for example, the Coleman cooler in my kitchen, or the kitchen itself, or my house, or the state of Florida.    Never mind that none of these latter are even close to energetically isolated, and suppose for a moment that I lived in a quasi energetically isolated house.  There are no choices to be made.  The house is a branch system with respect to the outside world, and the cooler is a branch system with respect to the house.  On the branch system proposal, at the moment that they become energetically isolated, both take on microconditions according to the probability distribution given by Boltzmann’s postulate.  I don’t see why this should be a problem.
Recall, then, that the first question was this:  How are we to decide at exactly what moment a branch system comes into being?  From a methodological point of view, this worry seems to pack no punch at all.  From the point of view of doing our physics, that is to say from the point of view of building models that are accurate enough for our needs, its seems entirely unnecessary to be able to pinpoint the precise moment at which a branch system come into being.  As in most modeling situations, an approximate value will do.  At the risk of cartooning, the question that Albert really seems to want to ask is “how does the universe know the precise moment at which a branch system comes into being so that it can know to apply the Boltzmann postulate?”
So clearly, more is at stake in Albert’s first two questions then simple methodological worries.  When the question “How are we to decide at exactly what moment a branch system comes into being?” is asked, we can hear the clear reverberations of a long standing question from the foundations of quantum mechanics: “How does the universe know what counts as a measurement?”  One way of thinking about the measurement problem, after all, is that quantum mechanics provides us with two different laws of evolution, the Schrödinger equation of state evolution and the projection postulate, and there doesn’t seem to be any principled basis for choosing which one to apply.  The worry here is very similar, there doesn’t seem to be any principled way of deciding when the microlaws hold and the Boltzmann postulate will be applied.
Boltzmann’s postulate, after all, is a postulate about microconditions.  But once the microconditions for the world are specified for some particular time, (say, at the beginning of the universe) isn’t it the microlaws that are supposed to fix the microconditions of all states of affairs at all future times?  Isn’t that what microlaws are supposed to do?  Were does the branch system proposal get the temerity, then, to flagrantly disregard the clear and present authority of the microlaws and simply stipulate that the microconditions (or, at least, the probability distribution of a set of possible microconditions) as an ojective, empirical and contingent fact about the world just are such and such.  But this worry, like all worries, has a presupposition.
Frameworks and Possible Worlds
The presupposition behind this worry is a supposition about the very nature of scientific laws.   The supposition is that laws must give us necessary, universally applicable, complete, and exact descriptions of the way the world will necessarily be, given any physically possible set of initial conditions.  There are many different ways in which philosophers have tried to spell out this kind of picture in detail. I will call the core of all such views about laws the “possible worlds” account of laws to emphasize the fact that on this picture, laws have universal (worldly) scope, and that they, in conjunction with a set of physically possible initial conditions, delimit a set of possible ways that the world could present itself, through the entire course of its temporal evolution.
There is, however, a strong, viable, and more pragmatic alternative to this conception of laws; call it the “framework” conception​[6]​. On this conception, laws provide a framework for building models, schematizing experiments, and representing phenomena. Laws, moreover, have very broad, but not universal, domains of application. Rather than taking laws to be universally true and delimiting the character of all possible worlds, the proponent of the framework conception takes laws to be broadly reliable for a wide array of practical and epistemic tasks.  
Can this final worry about the branch system proposal be motivated on the framework conception of laws? I don’t think it can.  If the worry is about the authority of the microlaws, the proponent of the framework conception can simply reply that it is a mistake to think that the microlaws need offer us a complete description of the universe.  In fact, the best evidence from statistical mechanics is that our time-reversible microlaws are not complete in this sense.  They need to be supplemented by Boltzmann’s postulate whenever we want to model an energetically isolated system.​[7]​  But this comes as no surprise to us framework types.  We know that laws are for building models, and that all models have initial conditions and boundary conditions.  Sometimes we specify these conditions explicitly, sometimes statistically.  
This suggestion about how to think about the branch systems proposal is closely aligned with Cartwright’s approach to the measurement problem.  Cartwright argues that since none of our physical models get things exactly right, it's just fine to rely on one model which gives us probabilities for outcomes, classically described, and then, when we find one of those outcomes, re-describe it again quantum mechanically.  From this perspective, as long as we get a model accurate enough for our needs, the details of where we draw the line don't matter.  
The possible worlds view demands that, though it may well be out of human reach, there is one model that accommodates all phenomena.  In contrast the framework view endorses the logically weaker quantifier ordering.  For each phenomenon there is at least one model that accommodates that phenomenon.​[8]​  Given any of the possible energetically isolated systems of our scientific experience, we can provide a model in terms of the microlaws that perfectly explains its thermodynamic behavior.  The possible worlds view demands of laws that they provide one model of all possible phenomena.  In the past 140 years since Boltzmann began to work on his H-theorem, no one has been able to suggest how the latter can be done.
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^1	  This outline closely follows Albert (2000)
^2	  It is not my goal in this paper to provide an exegesis of what Reichenbach or Davies actually had in mind, but rather to articulate what I think is the most sensible position.  
^3	  See (Albert, 2000, p. 64),
^4	  Albert also worries that we don't know that there aren't logical consistency problems with asserting Boltzmann's postulate with respect to all of the different branch systems.  But since he does not give any argument for this worry, I will not consider it further.  
^5	  There are a number of sources that suggest that what I call the “big bang proposal” has closed the case on this issue.  In addition to (Albert, 2000), see (Callendar, forthcoming).
^6	  Cartwright (1983, 1999), Giere (1988, 1999).
^7	  Compare this proposal to Frisch’s (2000).
^8	  This discussion in terms of the order of quantifiers deliberately borrows from Paul Teller (2001, p. 143-44)
